Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2012

The Mentally Disordered Criminal Defendant at the Supreme
Court: A Decade in Review
Dora W. Klein
St. Mary's University School of Law, dklein@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dora W. Klein, The Mentally Disordered Criminal Defendant at the Supreme Court: A Decade in Review, 91
Or. L. Rev. 207 (2012).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

KLEIN (DO NOT DELETE)

10/30/2012 1:01 PM

DORA W. KLEIN*

The Mentally Disordered Criminal
Defendant at the Supreme Court: A
Decade in Review
Introduction ...................................................................................... 207
I.
The Culpability of Juvenile Offenders .................................. 209
A. Culpability Sufficient for Execution .............................. 210
B. Culpability Sufficient for Life Without Parole............... 215
II.
Mental States and Criminal Process ...................................... 217
A. Criminal Defenses: Clark v. Arizona ............................. 219
1. The Insanity Defense ................................................ 220
2. Mental Illness Evidence ........................................... 222
B. Competency to Stand Trial: Sell v. United States .......... 224
C. Competency to Be Executed: Panetti v. Quarterman .... 232
III. Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders ................................. 234
A. Mental Abnormality and Volitional Control: Kansas
v. Hendricks.................................................................... 236
B. The Role of Treatment Provision: Seling v. Young ........ 241
Conclusion........................................................................................ 244
INTRODUCTION

T

1

he relationship between criminal law and clinical psychology is
complex.2 Mental states are central to criminal law, so clinical
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psychology is, at least to some extent, an indispensible ally. But the
ultimate goals of criminal law and clinical psychology are not the
same. Clinical psychology aims to understand and to alter mental
states, while criminal law usually is more concerned with determining
the existence of particular mental states at particular points in time.
Clinical psychology wants to know what caused the delusional belief
and how to alleviate it, while criminal law wants to know if the
delusional belief precluded knowledge of an act’s wrongfulness or
interfered with understanding the reason for a death sentence. Clinical
psychology disclaims moral judgments, while criminal law is
fundamentally a moral enterprise.
The necessary—but necessarily imperfect—relationship between
criminal law and clinical psychology means that when a person with a
mental disorder is charged with or has been convicted of a criminal
offense, the legal system should look to clinical psychology for its
understanding of mental disorder, but should do so carefully.
Overreliance, underreliance, or misplaced reliance on clinical
psychology all can lead to results that are inconsistent with the aims
of criminal law. In the past decade, at least eight cases involving
issues at the intersection of criminal law and clinical psychology have
reached the U.S. Supreme Court. This Article considers how carefully
the Supreme Court has used clinical psychology’s understanding of
mental abnormality to answer criminal law’s questions.
The cases discussed in this Article concern three general topics: the
culpability of juvenile offenders; mental states and the criminal
process, including the presentation of mental disorder evidence,
competency to stand trial, and competency to be executed; and the
preventive detention of convicted sex offenders. Part I examines two
cases that adopted categorical exclusions from certain kinds of
punishment—the death penalty and life without parole—for juvenile
offenders, based on the diminished culpability of juveniles as
compared to adult offenders. Both of these cases built on a third
recent case, which categorically excluded people with mental
1 “Clinical psychology” is used in this Article to refer broadly to the study of mental
abnormality or disability. Included in this field are not only clinical psychologists but also
psychiatrists and neuroscientists, among others.
2 See Judith M. Barger, Avoiding Atkins v. Virginia: How States Are Circumventing
Both the Letter and the Spirit of the Court’s Mandate, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 215, 231
(2008) (“When the fields of psychology and criminal law intersect, it generally leads to
tension between the two . . . .”); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 143–44 (2009) (“Criminal law and psychology have
important, but difficult relations . . . .”).
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retardation from the death penalty. In all three of these cases, the
Court overrelied on the results of psychological studies to justify its
legal conclusions. Part II discusses three cases involving questions
about mental states. The Court misunderstood the relevant
psychology in two of these cases. In one case, the misunderstanding
led the Court to uphold a state law prohibiting criminal defendants
from presenting mental illness evidence to raise reasonable doubt
about mens rea. In the second case, the Court adopted a nearly
limitless test for determining when the government may administer
involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering a
criminal defendant competent to stand trial. The Court demonstrated a
more complete understanding of the relevant psychology in the third
case, recognizing that delusional beliefs can preclude a convicted
prisoner’s understanding of the state’s reasons for carrying out a death
sentence. Part III considers two cases involving the question whether
the preventive detention of convicted sex offenders is really civil
commitment, as states have claimed, or is instead criminal
punishment, as its critics have claimed. Among the issues raised in
these cases are the legal primacy of diagnoses recognized by
psychiatrists and the moral justification for the civil commitment of
people who are dangerous because of a mental disorder.
I
THE CULPABILITY OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS
Two recent cases dramatically altered sentencing for juvenile
offenders.3 The first case, Roper v. Simmons, held that the death
penalty is categorically cruel and unusual punishment for a juvenile
offender—that is, an offender who committed his offense before the
age of eighteen.4 The second case, Graham v. Florida, held that life
without parole is categorically cruel and unusual punishment for a
juvenile offender who committed a non-homicide offense.5 Both
Roper and Graham relied on the framework for categorical exclusions
established in Atkins v. Virginia, which ruled—just a year before

3 The Court recently decided a third juvenile sentencing case, primarily on procedural
grounds. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (ruling that mandatory life without
parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because they deprive
sentencing judges of the opportunity to mitigate an offender’s sentence based on youth).
This case is discussed briefly infra note 38.
4 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
5 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
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Roper—that the death penalty is categorically cruel and unusual
6
punishment for people diagnosed with mental retardation.
A. Culpability Sufficient for Execution
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishments.”7 Traditionally, courts—led by the Supreme Court—
have assessed whether a particular punishment (other than the death
penalty) is “cruel and unusual” by conducting a proportionality
review—weighing the severity of the offense against the severity of
8
the punishment. So long as the punishment is not grossly
disproportionate to the offense, the punishment is not “cruel and
unusual.”9 Prior to 2000, the Supreme Court had adopted only one
categorical rule regarding proportionality: that the death penalty is a
categorically disproportionate punishment for the non-homicide
10
offense of rape when the victim is an adult. In 2008, the Court
extended this holding, ruling that the rape of a child also is
insufficient to justify a sentence of death.11
The Court has recently expanded the scope of its categorical rules
to apply to offenders as well as offenses, ruling that the death penalty
is a categorically disproportionate punishment for mentally retarded
adult offenders and for all juvenile offenders,12 and that a sentence of
life without parole is a categorically disproportionate punishment for
juvenile offenders, at least for those who commit non-homicide
offenses.13
The first case to find that the death penalty is a categorically
disproportionate punishment for a certain kind of offender was Atkins
v. Virginia, in which the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment
6

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
8 Until Graham v. Florida, it seemed that the Court had developed two separate forms
of analysis, one for capital punishment cases and one for noncapital punishment cases. See
Alison Siegler and Barry Sullivan, “Death is Different” No Longer: Graham v. Florida
and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 327, 327 (2010).
9 The Supreme Court’s proportionality review cases are few and far between, and only
once has the Court ruled that a particular offender’s sentence was disproportionate to the
offense. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
10 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
11 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008).
12 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002).
13 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
7
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precludes capital punishment for offenders who are mentally
14
retarded. The Court explained that the deficits of people who are
mentally retarded mean that they cannot be among the worst of the
worst offenders, for whom the death penalty is reserved.15 In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court applied the reasoning of Atkins to conclude that
the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of offenders who
16
were under eighteen years old when they committed their crimes.
The Court’s opinions in both Atkins and Roper demonstrate an
appreciation for the findings of clinical psychologists and other
scientists—both opinions, for example, cited research findings to
support the conclusions that juveniles and people with mental
retardation are less culpable than adults or people without mental
retardation.17 To some extent, this appreciation is welcome; certainly,
research findings about the relative emotional and decision-making
capabilities of juveniles and people with mental retardation ought to
inform decisions about culpability for criminal behavior. On the other
hand, the Court’s opinions in Atkins and Roper fail to take adequate
account of the limits of this research.18
The Court’s opinion in Roper relied heavily on the framework
established in Atkins, in particular the foundational premise that
14

536 U.S. at 319.
Id. (“If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most
extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.”). The Court also decided that a
national consensus exists against executing people who are mentally retarded. Id. at 316.
That aspect of the Court’s decision is beyond the scope of this Article.
16 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (“[W]e remarked in Atkins that ‘[i]f the culpability of the
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State,
the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of
retribution.’ The same conclusions follow from the lesser culpability of the juvenile
offender.” (citation omitted)).
17 See id. at 569–70; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–19.
18 See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. While those who are pleased with the
ultimate decisions in these cases might be tempted to forgive these failures, the misuse of
research findings can have undesired consequences. Perhaps the best-known example is
the Supreme Court’s citing of social science studies in footnote 11 of its opinion in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); citing these sources arguably detracted from
the perceived legitimacy of the Court’s decision: “In the eyes of many legal scholars who
were otherwise supportive of Brown, the Court’s citations to social science undermined its
integrity.” Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 n.5 (2011).
On the other hand, ignoring science is not a solution: “The law, by its nature, is
inextricably linked with other disciplines. . . . Science and technology permeate every inch
of modern society and, consequently, virtually every case before the law. Courts simply no
longer have the luxury of ignoring science.” David L. Faigman, Embracing the Darkness:
Logerquist v. McVey and the Doctrine of Ignorance of Science is an Excuse, 33 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 87, 101 (2001).
15
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psychological characteristics of certain kinds of offenders make them,
as a group, appropriate for categorical exclusion from eligibility for
19
the death penalty. To this framework, the Roper Court added
research findings concerning the psychological differences between
20
juveniles and adults. This research demonstrates, according to the
Court, that there are “[t]hree general differences between juveniles
under 18 and adults,” and that because of these differences, “juvenile
offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
21
offenders.”
The three differences are: (1) “the comparative
immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles,” (2) the increased
susceptibility of juveniles to peer pressure and other external
influences, and (3) the “more transitory, less fixed” nature of
22
juveniles’ personality traits. The Court cites just one study in
support of each of these differences, but the lack of more extensive
citations is not an important flaw—no one, not even the dissenters in
this case, would argue with the conclusions the Court reaches about
juveniles on the basis of this research.23 As compared to adults,
19 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability
makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319)).
20 The Court also found that there is a national consensus against sentencing juveniles
to death. Id. at 564–67. That issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
21 Id. at 569 (“Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders.”).
22 Id. at 569–70.
23 For example, Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion acknowledged, “It is beyond
cavil that juveniles as a class are generally less mature, less responsible, and less fully
formed than adults.” Id. at 599 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s dissenting
opinion pointed to an inconsistency between the research findings presented in Roper and
the argument, made in other cases, that juveniles ought to be accorded substantial
autonomy in areas such as decision making about abortion. Id. at 617–18 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). As several commentators have argued, it is possible to reduce some of the
inconsistency by focusing on the different contexts. The decision to commit a crime takes
place under a different set of circumstances than does the decision to accept or refuse
medical treatment. Thus, we might be willing to accept that the same relative
psychological immaturity of juveniles should not necessarily result in the same legal rules
in different contexts. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than
Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA
“Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 593 (2009) (“[T]he seemingly conflicting
positions . . . are not contradictory. Rather, they simply emphasize different aspects of
maturity, in accordance with the differing nature of the decision-making scenarios
involved in each case.”); see also Donald L. Beschle, Cognitive Dissonance Revisited:
Roper v. Simmons and the Issue of Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 52 WAYNE
L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2006); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging a
Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and
Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927, 948–53 (2006). But there is some amount of
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juveniles do tend to lack maturity and responsibility, do tend to be
more susceptible to external influences, and do tend to have
personality traits that are less fixed.
The problem with the Court’s use of research is not the particular
conclusions it reaches about juveniles as compared to adults. Rather,
the problem is the suggestion that these research findings about the
general differences of juveniles as compared to adults necessarily
24
compel any particular legal rules regarding juveniles. The Court
does not claim that the research proves that every juvenile is less
responsible than is any adult. Indeed, the opinion explicitly
acknowledges that the differences between juveniles and adults are
25
only general tendencies, not absolute or unvarying characteristics.
But in explaining why the culpability of individual juveniles cannot
be assessed in the usual manner—by the jury—the Court asserts that
“[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to
receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”26 This
reasoning uses research findings about the general differences
between juveniles and adults to mask what the court really is
saying27—that juries cannot be trusted to make accurate assessments
inconsistency that seems irreducible—if the psychological maturity of juveniles is so
different from adults that they cannot be subject to the same legal punishments, then
should they not be protected in other areas as well, such as medical treatment decision
making? This is a complex normative question about the different purposes of different
legal rules, and the Court’s implication in Roper that there is a straight line from
descriptions of research findings about juveniles’ relative maturity to a decision about the
desirability of a particular punishment is unhelpful at best.
24 The dissenters in Roper noted this problem, as have subsequent commentators. See
Roper, 543 U.S. at 601 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s proportionality argument
. . . fails to establish that the differences in maturity between 17-year-olds and young
‘adults’ are both universal enough and significant enough to justify a bright-line
prophylactic rule against capital punishment of the former.”); Richard A. Posner,
Foreward: A Political Court, in The Supreme Court, 2004 Term,, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31,
64–65 (2005) (“The studies on which the Court relied acknowledge that their findings that
sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds are less likely to make mature judgments than eighteenyear-olds are statistical rather than individual and do not support a categorical exclusion of
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds from the ranks of the mature.”(footnote omitted)).
25 Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already
attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”).
26 Id. at 572–73.
27 See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 7 (2009). As Professor
Feldman explains,
Relying on science gives us a delightfully convenient way to avoid the problems
in front of us. In so many circumstances, we use science to create the Illusion of
Reasonable Resolution where the solution is not reasoned nor is the issue
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of culpability.28 The opinion fails to adequately support the
conclusion that juries are insufficiently capable of determining which
29
juveniles are mature and which are not. The Court says that there is
an “unacceptable likelihood” that juries will make mistakes, but does
not provide any evidence about how great this likelihood is or offer
30
any reason why this particular likelihood is unacceptable.
That the Court fails to adequately explain its decision does not
necessarily mean that the decision cannot be explained. Indeed, since
Roper, several scholars have offered explanations that are quite
compelling.31 But these explanations confront what the Court did not:
resolved. Science allows us to ignore the fact that we have failed to resolve
anything, or it allows us to mask the preferences embodied in the outcome.
Id.
28 Both dissenting opinions pointed this out. See id. at 602–03 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “these concerns may properly be addressed not by means of an
arbitrary, categorical age-based rule, but rather through individualized sentencing in which
juries are required to give appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant’s immaturity, his
susceptibility to outside pressures, his cognizance of the consequences of actions, and so
forth”); id. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (proposing that the Court’s “startling conclusion
undermines the very foundations of our capital sentencing system, which entrusts juries
with ‘mak[ing] the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification and that
buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system.’” (quoting McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987))).
29 Id. at 603–04 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I would not be so quick to conclude that
the constitutional safeguards, the sentencing juries, and the trial judges upon which we
place so much reliance in all capital cases are inadequate in this narrow context.”); id. at
620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court concludes . . . that juries cannot be trusted with the
delicate task of weighing a defendant’s youth along with the other mitigating and
aggravating factors of his crime. This startling conclusion undermines the very
foundations of our capital sentencing system . . . .”).
30 Id. at 573 (majority opinion) (“An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or
cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than
death.”).
31 Arguably the best of these is Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v.
Simmons and Age Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2006). See also Jay D.
Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 115 (2007); Harry F. Tepker, Tradition & The Abolition of Capital
Punishment for Juvenile Crime, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 809 (2006). Another possible defense
of the decision in Roper is that “execution should be reserved for the worst of the worst
and no youth under eighteen, regardless of how egregious the killing, fits into that class of
individuals.” Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth
Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 35 (2009). But the assertion that juveniles cannot be among
the worst of the worst is contestable. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, The Differing Concepts
of Culpability in Law and Psychology, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 83, 90 (2004) (“It is simply
untrue that no person under the age of 16 . . . is []capable of carrying out a horrible murder
with the requisite intent or foresight.”).
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that juries’ inability to accurately assess culpability is not a problem
that can be fixed by excluding juveniles from the death penalty. If a
jury cannot be trusted to determine which seventeen-year-olds are
sufficiently culpable to be sentenced to death and which are not, why
should juries be trusted to determine which nineteen-year-olds are
sufficiently culpable to be sentenced to death and which are not? Or
to determine which seventeen-year-olds are sufficiently culpable to be
sentenced to life in prison—or to any other punishment—and which
are not?
B. Culpability Sufficient for Life Without Parole
If the inability of juries to accurately assess culpability is the
problem that Roper’s categorical exclusion of juveniles from the
death penalty solved, the question arises: What about juries’ ability to
assess culpability in noncapital cases? After Roper, the Court might
have justified categorically excluding juveniles from the death
penalty, while leaving them subject to juries’ potentially erroneous
assessments of their culpability in noncapital cases, by offering the
observation that “death is different.”32 But after Graham v. Florida,
that justification is foreclosed.33 In Graham, the Court ruled that as a
group, juveniles are insufficiently culpable to be sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, at least for non-homicide
offenses.34 In this case, the Court uses more absolute language than it
32 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“[T]he death penalty is the most severe punishment, [and]
the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.”). Before Graham, the Supreme
Court had considered Eighth Amendment death penalty claims to be altogether different
than Eighth Amendment claims in non-death penalty cases. See Rachel E. Barkow, The
Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case
for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2046 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court’s decision
“eviscerates [the] distinction” between capital and noncapital cases); id. at 2038–39
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Treating juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital
punishment is at odds with our longstanding view that ‘the death penalty is different from
other punishments in kind rather than degree.’”) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
294 (1983)).
33 The Court might now argue death and life without parole are different. See Graham,
130 S. Ct. at 2027 (“It is true that a death sentence is ‘unique in its severity and
irrevocability,’ . . . yet life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death
sentences that are shared by no other sentences.” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
187 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). But that raises the question
what other punishments are also different.
34 The Court in Graham says that the difference between homicide offenses and nonhomicide offenses is important. See id. at 2027 (“[A] juvenile offender who did not kill or
intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”). It is difficult, however, to
imagine how the Court would explain a decision allowing juveniles to be sentenced to life
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did in Roper to describe the differences between juveniles and adults.
For example, the Graham opinion describes Roper as having
“established that because juveniles have lessened culpability they are
less deserving of the most severe punishments.”35 But Roper did not
establish that all juveniles are necessarily less culpable, only that
juveniles as a group tend to be less culpable, and that any particular
36
juvenile is therefore less likely to be culpable. The Graham opinion
mostly relies on Roper for the proposition that juveniles are less
culpable, although the Court does cite one additional finding, from
“psychology and brain science,” that “parts of the brain involved in
37
behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.” This
process of continued maturation would seem to argue against any
bright-line rule about punishment, given that “late adolescence” does
not end abruptly at age eighteen. But the Court ignores this nuance
and continues to offer generalized statements about “juveniles,”
“minors,” and “the status of the offenders.”38
As in Roper, the real issue in Graham was not whether a juvenile is
likely to be less culpable than an adult; instead, the real issue was
whether the decision-makers—in Roper, the jury, and in Graham, the
sentencing judge—can be trusted to make accurate assessments of
culpability.39 In Graham, the Court again chose to adopt a categorical
rule excluding juveniles from eligibility for a certain punishment, but
it could have chosen other solutions. In both Roper and Graham, then,
research findings support the Court’s identified problem—that a
without parole for homicide offenses, given the centrality of juveniles’ categorically
diminished culpability to the Court’s decisions in both Graham and Roper. See id. at 2055
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that distinguishing homicide and non-homicide offenses
is evidence that “the Court does not even believe its pronouncements about the juvenile
mind”).
35 Id. at 2026 (majority opinion).
36 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567–68 (2005).
37 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
38 Id. at 2027 (“Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults. . . . [I]t would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult . . . . These matters relate
to the status of the offenders in question . . . .”). The Court continues this tendency in
Miller, which includes no qualifying language at all; instead, the opinion consistently
refers to “juveniles” and “children” as being different from adults. See, e.g., Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“[J]uveniles have diminished culpability and
greater prospects for reform, . . . children have a ‘lack of maturity and an undeveloped
sense of responsibility,’ . . . [and] a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s
. . . .” (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70)).
39 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (“This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility
that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who
are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.”).
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juvenile is likely to be less culpable than an adult—but not
necessarily the Court’s chosen remedy. To the extent that the research
findings that the Court relies on in both Roper and Graham
demonstrate that psychological maturation is a variable process, with
some people achieving maturity before the age of eighteen and some
achieving maturity later, these findings counsel against categorical
rules regarding the punishment of juveniles based on general findings
40
about their culpability relative to the culpability of adults.
II
MENTAL STATES AND CRIMINAL PROCESS
Mental states are central to criminal responsibility. In almost every
criminal trial, the jury must make a determination about the
defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense, as almost all
crimes include a mens rea element.41 The law in most jurisdictions
also considers whether, at the time of the offense, a person understood
the nature and quality of his acts and appreciated the wrongfulness of
those acts. If he did not, then he is not guilty by reason of insanity.42
Additionally, criminal prosecution and punishment require certain
mental competencies at several points, including at the time of the
trial and at the time of the imposition of a death sentence.43 At the
time of the trial, due process requires that the law ask whether a
40 The Court’s reference to other categorical rules involving juveniles, such as rules
about drinking ages and voting ages, is unpersuasive, because practical considerations of
time and expense justify such broadly applicable rules. In the case of a juvenile charged
with or convicted of a crime, however, an individualized decision maker is already a part
of the system. See Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply
the Want of Years?, 86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 386 (2011) (explaining that some “age-based
categorical rules . . . such as those disqualifying all minors from voting and those minors
below a specified age from driving . . . capture enough of the truth to make more finetuned distinctions not worthwhile,” but that individualized assessment is already a part of
the criminal process: “In the case of sentencing juveniles convicted of serious felonies,
however, the judicial system has already incurred a substantial cost in a highly
individualized inquiry: this particular defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of committing a certain act; and this particular defendant has been deemed to
possess a particular culpability.”).
41 The Supreme Court has approved certain kinds of strict liability crimes, but they are
disfavored. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) (observing that
“offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored”).
42 All but four states as well as the federal government recognize some form of an
insanity defense. Most insanity defenses are some variant of the test set forth in
M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S.
735, 750–51 (2006).
43 These points account for most cases in which competency is an issue, although it is
also an issue at other points, such as at the time of waiving an appeal.
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person understands the charges against him and is able to assist his
44
attorney in presenting a defense. If he does not, then he is
45
incompetent to stand trial. Similarly, at the time of the imposition of
a death sentence, due process requires that the law ask whether a
46
person understands the state’s reasons for executing him. If he does
47
not, then he is unfit to be executed.
Although the legal principles that underlie these connections
between criminal law and mental states are based on long-standing
precedents, in recent years the Supreme Court has decided cases that
involve all of these principles. In Clark v. Arizona, the Court
considered challenges to an Arizona law that limited the scope of the
insanity defense and to an interpretation of Arizona law that
prohibited defendants from presenting evidence of mental disorder for
the purpose of disproving mens rea.48 Although the Court found that
neither of Arizona’s restrictions violated the federal Constitution,
Justice Kennedy submitted a forceful and insightful dissenting
opinion arguing that not allowing criminal defendants to present
mental disorder evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea was
unconstitutional.49 In Sell v. United States, the Court set forth the
conditions under which the state may administer involuntary
medications to a pretrial detainee for the purpose of rendering the
50
detainee competent to stand trial. This case resolved some of the
uncertainty that had plagued the trial courts regarding the question
whether the government’s interest in adjudicating criminal charges
could justify the administration of involuntary medications when the
medications were not also justified by the government’s interest in

44 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960).
45 The same standard generally determines related competencies at the time of trial,
including competency to waive counsel and competency to plead guilty. See Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397 (1993). But see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169–72
(2008) (ruling that the Constitution does not prohibit states from imposing a higher
standard for competency for self-representation). Additionally, a waiver of constitutional
rights such as the right to counsel must be “knowing[] and intelligent[].” See Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938).
46 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
401 (1986).
47 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958.
48 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 800 (2006).
49 Id. at 781–800 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
50 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
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diminishing dangerousness.51 There are several problems with the
Sell decision, however, that reflect a lack of understanding about how
52
antipsychotic medications work. Finally, in Panetti v. Quarterman,
the Court clarified that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death
cannot be executed if he does not “rationally understand” the reasons
53
for the execution. This opinion is laudable for the depth of
understanding it demonstrates regarding the potential impact of
54
psychotic symptoms on cognitive functioning.
A. Criminal Defenses: Clark v. Arizona
Eric Clark was charged with first-degree murder for shooting and
killing a police officer.55 In defense, Clark argued that when he shot
56
the officer, he believed that the officer was an alien. At his bench
trial, Clark wanted to present evidence of his mental illness,
particularly of his delusional beliefs, to support his claim that because
he thought the officer was an alien, he did not intentionally or
knowingly kill a police officer.57 And because he did not knowingly
or intentionally kill a police officer, Clark argued, he should be found
not guilty either by reason of insanity or because he lacked the
58
requisite mens rea for first-degree murder. The Arizona trial court
allowed Clark to present evidence of his mental illness for the
purpose of supporting his insanity defense but not for the purpose of
disproving mens rea.59 Clark argued on appeal that not allowing him
to present evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea violated
51

See infra note 105.
See infra Part II.B.
53 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007).
54 See infra Part II.C.
55 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743 (2006).
56 Clark, 548 U.S. at 743–44.
57 Id. at 743–45.
58 Id. Clark is an unusual case because Clark’s particular delusional beliefs do give rise
to both a failure of proof defense (the defense that he lacked the mens rea to commit the
charged offense) and an insanity defense. More typically, delusional beliefs might give
rise to an insanity defense but not to a failure of proof defense. In the case of Andrea
Yates, for example, her delusional belief that if she killed her children they would be saved
from eternal damnation might mean that she did not appreciate the wrongfulness of her
actions, but the delusional belief does not mean that she lacked the intent to kill the
children. See Christine Michalopoulos, Filling in the Holes of the Insanity Defense: The
Andrea Yates Case and the Need for a New Prong, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 383, 395
(2003). Clark’s belief that the officer was an alien means both that he did not appreciate
the wrongfulness of his actions and also that he lacked the intent to kill a police officer.
59 Clark, 548 U.S. at 745 (“The trial court ruled that Clark could not rely on evidence
bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea.”).
52

KLEIN (DO NOT DELETE)

220

10/30/2012 1:01 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91, 207

his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial.60 Additionally,
61
Clark challenged the constitutionality of Arizona’s insanity defense,
which includes only one part of the traditionally two-part M’Naghten
test for insanity.62
The Supreme Court ruled against Clark on both arguments. The
Court held that neither the narrowing of the definition of insanity nor
the prohibiting of mental illness evidence for the purpose of
63
disproving mens rea violated Clark’s due process rights. Justice
Kennedy wrote a trenchant dissent, explaining why prohibiting Clark
from presenting evidence of his mental illness to disprove mens rea
64
did in fact violate due process.
1. The Insanity Defense
The law has long acknowledged that the mental functioning of
some people is so disordered that they ought not to be held criminally
65
responsible for their acts. Someone who is insane is excused from
criminal responsibility despite having committed the proscribed act
with the requisite mens rea. Today, federal law and the laws of fortysix states recognize some kind of insanity defense, most commonly a
form of the test set forth in the case of M’Naghten.66 Under
M’Naghten, someone is insane if he lacks knowledge of the nature
60

Id. at 756.
Although this Article will refer to it as an insanity defense (because the Supreme
Court in Clark did so), Arizona’s “insanity defense” is really a “guilty but mentally ill
defense”:
If the finder of fact finds the defendant guilty except insane, the court shall
determine the sentence the defendant could have received . . . if the defendant
had not been found insane, and the judge shall sentence the defendant to a term
of incarceration in the state department of corrections and shall order the
defendant to be placed under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review
board and committed to a state mental health facility under the department of
health services . . . for that term.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(D) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 50th
Leg. (2012)).
62 Clark, 548 U.S. at 747.
63 Id. at 756 (“We are satisfied that neither in theory nor in practice did Arizona’s 1993
abridgment of the insanity formulation deprive Clark of due process.”); see also id. at 779
(“Arizona’s rule serves to preserve the State’s chosen standard for recognizing insanity as
a defense and to avoid confusion and misunderstanding on the part of jurors.”).
64 See id. at 781–800 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65 See J.C. Oleson, The Insanity of Genius: Criminal Culpability and Right-Tail
Psychometrics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 587, 634 (2009) (noting that the insanity
defense’s “roots extend to Roman law”).
66 See Clark, 548 U.S. at 746–56.
61
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and quality of his act or if he lacks understanding of the wrongfulness
67
of the act.
Arizona’s insanity law at one point was essentially the M’Naghten
test.68 In 1993, the Arizona legislature narrowed the definition of
insanity to excuse only those who did not know that what they were
69
doing was wrong. Clark argued that Arizona’s narrowing of the
definition of insanity violated due process.70 The Supreme Court’s
prior precedents are fairly clear, however, that the Constitution does
not require any particular formulation of an insanity defense.71
Additionally, the Court in Clark avoided any particularized
analysis of Arizona’s insanity law by determining that although the
words of one part of the M’Naghten test are absent from Arizona law,
the law implicitly includes both parts because “[i]n practical terms, if
a defendant did not know what he was doing when he acted, he could
not have known that he was performing the wrongful act charged as a
crime.”72 The problem is that the Court’s example misstates
Arizona’s law, which provides the excuse of insanity to someone who
did not know the criminal act was wrong.73 It is possible that
someone did not know what he was doing but did know that the act he
was performing was a wrongful act. Clark, for example, believed that
he was killing an alien, yet he understood the wrongfulness of the act
he was actually performing—killing a police officer.74 To encompass
both kinds of not knowing, Arizona’s law would need to be
interpreted wholly subjectively, so that someone is not guilty by
67 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719 (defining as insane someone
who, because of a “disease of the mind,” did not “know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing” or did not “know that what he was doing was wrong”).
68 The prior Arizona law stated:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct the
person was suffering from such a mental disease or defect as not to know the
nature and quality of the act or, if such person did know, that such person did not
know that what he was doing was wrong.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (West 1978).
69 Arizona now defines insanity to excuse someone who “was afflicted with a mental
disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the criminal act was wrong.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-502(A) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 50th
Leg. (2012)). This law omits the part of the M’Naghten test that excuses someone who
does not know the nature and quality of his act.
70 Clark, 548 U.S. at 747.
71 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448–49 (1992); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 535–37 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798–801 (1952).
72 Clark, 548 U.S. at 753–54.
73 See supra note 69.
74 Clark, 548 U.S. at 743–45.
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reason of insanity if he did not know that the act he thought he was
performing was a wrongful act.
2. Mental Illness Evidence
Under Arizona law—at least as Arizona courts understood it before
the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark—criminal defendants cannot
present evidence of mental illness for the purpose of proving that they
lacked the requisite mens rea to be convicted of the charged offenses;
evidence of mental illness is admissible only for the purpose of
proving a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.75 In Clark, the
Court interpreted Arizona law somewhat differently, understanding it
to mean that criminal defendants are prohibited from presenting only
certain kinds of evidence, which the Court named “mental-disease
evidence” and “capacity evidence,” for the purpose of disproving
mens rea.76 By reconceptualizing Arizona law to exclude only some
mental illness evidence, the Court avoided the question that really
was raised by the trial court’s decision in Clark—the question
whether states can prohibit criminal defendants from presenting
evidence of mental illness for the purpose of proving that they lacked
77
the requisite intent to be guilty of the charged offense.
In detailing the many flaws in the Court’s reconceptualized
evidentiary scheme, Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion
demonstrates a sophisticated knowledge of the way that mental illness
is diagnosed and also of the difficulties a criminal defendant faces in
convincing a jury that a mental illness is more than an “abuse

75 As the Arizona Supreme Court explained it, “Arizona does not allow evidence of a
defendant’s mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate
the mens rea element of a crime.” State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1997) (quoted in
Clark, 548 U.S. at 745).
76 Clark, 548 U.S. at 757 (“Understanding Clark’s claim requires attention to the
categories of evidence with a potential bearing on mens rea.”).
77 As Justice Kennedy explained:
Seizing upon a theory invented here by the Court itself, the Court narrows
Clark’s claim so he cannot raise the point everyone else thought was involved in
the case. The Court says the only issue before us is whether there is a right to
introduce mental-disease evidence or capacity evidence, not a right to introduce
observation evidence. This restructured evidentiary universe, with no convincing
authority to support it, is unworkable on its own terms. Even were that not so,
however, the Court’s tripartite structure is something not addressed by the state
trial court, the state appellate court, counsel on either side in those proceedings,
or the briefs the parties filed with us. The Court refuses to consider the key part
of Clark’s claim because his counsel did not predict the Court’s own invention.
Clark, 548 U.S. at 781–82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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excuse.” For example, given that many people likely do not
understand how mental disorders are diagnosed, Justice Kennedy
quite accurately explains that allowing Clark’s witness to testify about
Clark’s schizophrenic symptoms but prohibiting the witness from
using the term “schizophrenia” would amount to “forcing the witness
to pretend that no one has yet come up with a way to classify the set
78
of symptoms being described.” And given the deep and wide
79
skepticism regarding mental illness defenses, Justice Kennedy is
surely correct that the witness’s testimony about Clark’s psychotic
symptoms “might not be believable without a psychiatrist confirming
the story based on his experience with people who have exhibited
80
similar behaviors.”
The Court identified two reasons that Arizona’s rule prohibiting
criminal defendants from presenting mental illness evidence did not
violate due process. First, the Court reasoned that because Arizona
could place on defendants the burden of proving insanity by clear and
convincing evidence, Arizona could also prevent defendants from
presenting mental illness evidence for the purpose of disproving mens
rea. The Court made this connection because allowing defendants to
present mental illness evidence to disprove mens rea would weaken
the defendant’s burden by allowing a jury to find him not guilty on
the basis of reasonable doubt about mens rea. Consequently, a
defendant could be found not guilty even though the defendant had
not met the burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing
81
evidence.
As Justice Kennedy explains in his dissenting opinion, the Court’s
analysis places the cart before the horse.82 Arizona’s interest in
effectuating its designated burden of proof regarding insanity cannot
justify depriving a criminal defendant of the right not to be found
guilty except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element
of the charged offense. So while it might be correct to say that
allowing criminal defendants to present evidence for the purpose of
disproving mens rea conflicts with Arizona’s law requiring
defendants to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, it is
78

Id. at 783.
Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations of the Unabomber, 24
VT. L. REV. 417, 470 (2000) (“Juries are notoriously skeptical of mental illness defenses,
even in cases where the illness is clear.”).
80 Clark, 548 U.S. at 783.
81 Id. at 771 (majority opinion).
82 Id. at 796–97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
79
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certainly more important that prohibiting defendants from presenting
evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea conflicts with the
83
Constitution’s guarantee of due process.
The untrustworthiness of mental illness evidence was the Court’s
second reason for its conclusion that Arizona’s rule prohibiting
criminal defendants from presenting mental illness evidence did not
violate due process.84 The Court suggested several ways that mental
illness evidence is untrustworthy, including that experts disagree
about psychiatric diagnoses and that experts have the potential to
mislead juries.85 But as Justice Kennedy points out, evidence about
mental illnesses is no less trustworthy than is evidence about most
other topics that juries must evaluate, especially given that trials are
designed to produce two contradictory accounts.86 Moreover, Justice
Kennedy astutely observes that prohibiting evidence of mental illness
is likely to leave the jury less rather than more enlightened: Arizona’s
“rule forces the jury to decide guilt in a fictional world with undefined
and unexplained behaviors but without mental illness.”87 To the
extent that mental illness evidence is confusing, it is likely because
mental illnesses are confusing. But the cost of reducing complexity by
prohibiting juries from considering evidence of mental illness is
decreased rather than increased trustworthiness.88
B. Competency to Stand Trial: Sell v. United States
A criminal defendant must be competent to stand trial; otherwise,
the trial violates due process guarantees of fundamental fairness.89 To
be competent to stand trial, a criminal defendant must possess a
83 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court achieves a moment of insight
about this, recognizing that “if the same evidence that affirmatively shows he was not
guilty by reason of insanity (or ‘guilty except insane’ under Arizona law . . .) also shows it
was at least doubtful that he could form mens rea, then he should not be found guilty in the
first place.” Clark, 548 U.S. at 773 (majority opinion). But the Court did not translate this
insight into a clear understanding of the difference between a defendant’s burden to prove
insanity and the prosecution’s burden to prove mens rea.
84 Clark, 548 U.S. at 773–74.
85 Id. at 774–76.
86 Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The trial court was capable of evaluating the
competing conclusions, as factfinders do in countless cases where there is a dispute among
witnesses.”).
87 Id. at 800.
88 Id. at 796 (noting that “the potential to mislead will be far greater under the Court’s
new evidentiary system, where jurors will receive observation evidence without the
necessary explanation from experts.”).
89 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385–87 (1966).
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rational understanding of the charges against him and also must be
able to cooperate with his attorney in presenting a defense to those
90
charges. Because this standard is fairly undemanding, relatively few
91
defendants are found incompetent. Of those who are incompetent,
some are incompetent for reasons that are likely irremediable—severe
92
mental retardation, for example. Others, though, are incompetent for
reasons that are potentially remediable—symptoms of psychosis, for
93
example. A defendant who is incompetent to stand trial because of
psychotic symptoms—such as a delusional belief that his attorney and
the trial judge are conspiring with the CIA to convict him—might be
made competent to stand trial if the psychotic symptoms were
alleviated. The most reliable way to alleviate psychotic symptoms is
by administering antipsychotic medications.94 Some defendants,
though, refuse to take such medications voluntarily, raising the
question whether the government may compel a defendant to take
such medications for the purpose of rendering the defendant
competent to stand trial.95

90 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (stating that the test for
competency to stand trial is “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”).
91 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due
Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 828–29 (2005) (“[A] small
percentage of seriously impaired adult defendants are referred for competence evaluations
and an even smaller percent are found to be incompetent to stand trial.”).
92 To some extent, competence to stand trial can be taught. For a thorough discussion of
programs designed to render defendants competent to stand trial, see Debra A. Pinals,
Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial from a Clinical
Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 103–08 (2005).
93 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–79 (2003) (considering whether
administering involuntary antipsychotic medications to a defendant who was incompetent
to stand trial because of delusions violated due process).
94 John M. Kane, Conventional Neuroleptic Treatment: Current Status, Future Role, in
THE NEW PHARMACOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 89, 90 (Alan Breier ed., 1996)
(describing antipsychotic medications as “the primary modality in the treatment of an
acute episode or an acute exacerbation of a schizophrenic illness”); Thomas H.
McGlashan, Rationale and Parameters for Medication-Free Research in Psychosis, 32
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 300, 301 (2006), available at http://schizophreniabulletin
.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/2/300.full (noting that antipsychotic medications are “the
most rapid, effective, and economical treatment for active psychosis”).
95 A related but fundamentally different question is when may the government compel
anyone, whether a criminal defendant or not, to take antipsychotic medications for the
purpose of diminishing that person’s dangerousness, either to himself or to others. See
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that “This is not a case like
Washington v. Harper in which the purpose of the involuntary medication was to ensure
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The Supreme Court has considered this question twice, first in
96
97
Riggins v. Nevada and most recently in Sell v. United States. In
Riggins, David Riggins appealed his conviction for robbery and
murder on the grounds that Nevada had violated his right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment and his right to a fair trial by compelling
98
him to take antipsychotic medications during his trial. The issue in
cases like Riggins is whether the state possesses an important enough
interest in bringing criminal defendants to trial to justify the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications, given that
these medications can cause side effects that are dangerous and
distressing, and also might interfere with the fairness of a criminal
99
trial. In this particular case, the Court was spared any truly hard
question because Nevada had not identified any interests that it hoped
to advance by not granting Riggins’s request to discontinue the
medications.100 The Court ruled that because the state had not
identified any government interests that required involuntary
antipsychotic medications, the state was not justified in administering
those medications to Riggins.101
The Court’s decision in Riggins was hardly surprising, given the
absence of any findings that would justify involuntary medications.
The more interesting and enduringly important opinion in Riggins
was Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which explored the problems that
involuntary antipsychotic medications might cause even in a case in
which the state had identified important government interests that
required such medications.102 Justice Kennedy envisioned the case
that the incarcerated person ceased to be a physical danger to himself or others.” (citation
omitted)).
96 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
97 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
98 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130–33.
99 The Court presumed, for the sake of argument, the reason the government continued
to administer antipsychotic medications was to maintain Riggins’s competency to stand
trial. See id. at 136 (“Were we to divine the District Court’s logic from the hearing
transcript, we would have to conclude that the court simply weighed the risk that the
defense would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins’ outward appearance against the
chance that Riggins would become incompetent if taken off Mellaril, and struck the
balance in favor of involuntary medication.”).
100 Id. at 131 (“The District Court denied Riggins’ motion to terminate medication with
a one-page order that gave no indication of the court’s rationale.”).
101 Id. at 138 (“Because the record contains no finding that might support a conclusion
that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential
state policy . . . we have no basis for saying that the substantial probability of trial
prejudice in this case was justified.”).
102 Id. at 138–45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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after Riggins—the case in which the government did present an
important interest that would be advanced by compelling the
103
defendant to take antipsychotic medications.
Assuming an
important government interest, what are the interests of the defendant
that would be compromised? There are at least two, although Justice
104
Kennedy’s opinion focuses on only one. The first interest is one
that is common to all people, whether charged with a crime or not: the
interest in making autonomous decisions about accepting or refusing
105
medical treatment. The second interest, which is unique to criminal
defendants and which was the focus of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, is
106
the interest in receiving a fair trial. As Justice Kennedy explained,
antipsychotic medications threaten to undermine the fairness of a
criminal trial in two ways: by affecting a defendant’s demeanor in the
courtroom and by affecting his interactions with counsel.107 The side
effects of antipsychotic medications include drowsiness and
agitation,108 conditions that a jury might misinterpret as a sign of
cold-heartedness or of a guilty conscience. And both conditions can
diminish motivation and ability to attend to the proceedings and to
assist counsel in presenting a defense. Throughout the opinion, Justice
Kennedy communicates quite forcefully his skepticism that states can
justify administering involuntary antipsychotic medications to
incompetent criminal defendants for the purpose of making them
109
competent to stand trial. He even contemplates the implications of
103

Id. at 138–39.
In addition to the insightful recognition of the problems that defendants might
experience because of involuntary antipsychotic medications, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is
laudable for not citing as potential problems things that really are not—in particular, the
“problems” of “synthetic sanity” and of “mind control.” See Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S.
Appelbaum, “Mind Control,” “Synthetic Sanity,” “Artificial Competence,” and Genuine
Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77,
79–88 (1983) (discussing some courts’ misunderstandings regarding the effects of
antipsychotic medications).
105 Prior to Sell, a few state and federal courts had ruled that this interest in bodily
autonomy is so substantial that the government’s interest in rendering a defendant
competent to stand trial is not an important enough interest to justify involuntary
medications. See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 953–54 (6th Cir. 1998);
Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp 1497, 1504–05 (D. Utah 1993).
106 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138–39.
107 Id. at 142.
108 Id. at 143.
109 See id. at 138–39 (“I file this separate opinion . . . to express my view that absent an
extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits prosecuting officials
from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines for purposes of rendering
the accused competent for trial, and to express doubt that the showing can be made in most
cases, given our present understanding of the properties of these drugs.”).
104
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his position, concluding that “[i]f the defendant cannot be tried
without his behavior and demeanor being affected in this substantial
way by involuntary treatment, in my view the Constitution requires
that society bear this cost in order to preserve the integrity of the trial
110
process.”
The Supreme Court encountered the case Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion had envisioned in Sell v. United States. In Sell, the
Court set forth a four-part test for determining when the government’s
interest in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial is important
enough to justify administering involuntary antipsychotic
111
medications. This test allows the government to administer these
medications if the court finds that they are (1) “medically
appropriate,” (2) “substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial,” (3) approved only after “taking
account of less intrusive alternatives,” and (4) “necessary
significantly to further important governmental trial-related
112
interests.”
The medical appropriateness and least intrusive means factors
primarily concern whether a defendant has been properly identified as
incompetent to stand trial because of symptoms that are treatable with
antipsychotic medications. Antipsychotic medications are not
medically appropriate for general behavioral control.113 If the purpose
of administering antipsychotic medication is to manage behavior
rather than to treat psychotic symptoms, then the medication is not
medically appropriate.114 And if a defendant is incompetent to stand
trial because he is experiencing psychotic symptoms, then
antipsychotic medications are likely to be the least intrusive means of
alleviating those symptoms and rendering him competent to stand
trial, given that antipsychotic medications are the only effective
treatment for psychotic symptoms.115 On the other hand, if someone
110

Id. at 145.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
112 Id.
113 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226 (1990).
114 See id.
115 See Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n and Am. Acad. of Psychiatry and the Law
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13–14, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003) (No. 02-5664) (“Antipsychotic medications are not only an accepted but often
essential, irreplaceable treatment for psychotic illnesses, as most firmly established for
schizophrenia, because the benefits of antipsychotic medications for patients with
psychoses, compared to any other available means of treatment, are so palpably great
compared with their generally manageable side effects.”).
111
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is incompetent for other reasons, then antipsychotic medications will
not be effective, regardless of what one thinks about their
intrusiveness. Thus, both the medical appropriateness and the least
intrusive means factors largely ask whether the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial because of psychotic symptoms that are
116
treatable with antipsychotic medications.
The remaining two factors are where the Sell test runs into
problems. The problem with requiring trial courts to find that
involuntary medications are necessary to further important
government interests is that the Court failed to explain how trial
courts ought to determine whether the government’s interests are
117
“important.” That the importance of the government’s interests is a
factor to be considered suggests that in some cases, the government’s
interests will not be important enough to satisfy this factor—and thus
the Court is not saying that the government’s interest in adjudicating
criminal charges is always important. But what distinguishes an
important government interest in adjudication from an unimportant
interest in adjudication?
Since Sell, courts have primarily considered potential punishment
in deciding whether a particular charge is serious enough to justify
118
involuntary medications.
But given that courts have ruled that
offenses punishable by a minimum potential sentence of just six
119
months imprisonment are “serious,”
it is difficult to imagine the
offense that could safely be said to be “not serious.”120

116

Additionally, antipsychotic medications might not be medically appropriate for
defendants who have other medical conditions, such as diabetes, that might be exacerbated
by antipsychotics.
117 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
118 Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1121,
1126 (2008) (“Most courts have judged the importance of bringing a defendant to trial
based on the maximum penalty the defendant could face if convicted.”).
119 United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Evans,
404 F.3d 227, 237–38 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739
(E.D. La. 2005). These courts borrowed the six months or more standard from the
Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment rule regarding the right to a jury trial. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
120 One example is United States v. Kourey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (S.D. W. Va.
2003) (“Defendant is not facing serious criminal charges upon which he will be tried.
Rather, Defendant is charged with violating the terms and conditions of his supervised
release imposed for his admitted commission of a Class A misdemeanor.”). Misdemeanor
offenses, though, are not categorically “not serious.” See United States v. Everage, No.
CRIM.A. 05-11-DLB, 2006 WL 1007274, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2006) (“Although
Defendant is charged with two misdemeanors, they both allegedly involve threats to
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An additional problem with Sell is the requirement that the court
find that involuntary medications are “substantially unlikely to have
121
side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial.”
While
this factor is an appropriate one to consider in theory, it is an
impossible one to apply in real life. Antipsychotic medications can
cause a myriad of side effects, many of which can interfere with the
fairness of a criminal trial, as Justice Kennedy ably explained in his
122
concurring opinion in Riggins. But even though side effects are an
important consideration, it is not possible to determine in advance
which side effects any particular person will experience. Across
individuals, and even within the same individual across time, both the
therapeutic effects and the side effects of antipsychotic medications
are varied and unpredictable.123 So under Sell, defense attorneys will
be unable to present evidence that establishes anything more than a
statistical probability that antipsychotic medications will cause side
effects that will undermine the fairness of a defendant’s trial.124 It can
be hoped that, if a court allows the government to administer
involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering a
defendant competent to stand trial, the court would continue to
monitor the defendant to see whether the defendant does experience
side effects that would undermine the fairness of his trial. However,
that issue is separate from the issue Sell addresses.
others, one with a firearm. The Court therefore concludes Defendant is charged with
serious crimes.”).
121 Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
122 See generally Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138–45 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
123 See United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 699 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The
FMC-Butner Evaluation noted that ‘[r]esponse to antipsychotic medication is highly
individual,’ and explained that ‘[b]ecause it is difficult to predict an individual’s response
to antipsychotic medication, [the APA statistics] have been provided to indicate the
likelihood of response if an individual is treated with an antipsychotic medication.’”
(alterations in original)).
124 The D.C. District Court recognized this problem, although it considered it from the
prosecutor’s point of view:
There are many uncertainties regarding the effects that medication will have on
[the defendant’s] demeanor and thought processes because the reaction to
medication is unique to each patient. However, the Court rejects [the
defendant’s] attorneys’ contention that this uncertainty precludes the use of
medication in this context at this time. To interpret “clear and convincing”
evidence as the defense suggests would effectively preclude involuntary
medication in every case, since the government could never establish that a given
individual would respond in a predictable manner, no matter how high the
statistical probabilities.
United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 136 (D. D.C. 2001).
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Yet another problem with Sell is the Court’s instruction to trial
courts to first consider whether an incompetent criminal defendant
can be administered involuntary antipsychotic medications on the
basis of dangerousness to himself or others before considering
whether these medications can be administered for the purpose of
125
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial. It is odd that the
Court would see these rationales as interchangeable—or even odder,
would see the dangerousness rationale as preferable—given that the
primary concern about administering involuntary antipsychotic
medications to pretrial detainees is the potential of these medications
to undermine the fairness of a criminal trial. Administering
involuntary antipsychotic medications to incompetent pretrial
detainees poses the exact same threat to the fairness of their trials
regardless of the rationale that justified administering the involuntary
medications.
A final oddity of the Sell opinion is the Court’s expressed
expectation that trial courts will only rarely approve administering
involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering
126
defendants competent to stand trial. There is no real limiting factor
127
in the Sell test, and had the Court possessed a better understanding
of antipsychotic medications, it might have predicted that courts
125 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 183 (“[A] court, asked to approve forced administration of
drugs for purposes of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily
determine whether the Government seeks, or has first sought, permission for forced
administration of drugs on these other Harper-type grounds; and, if not, why not.”).
126 See id. at 180 (“This standard will permit involuntary administration of drugs solely
for trial competence purposes in certain instances. But those instances may be rare.”).
127 And perhaps there should not be any limits. Some scholars have argued that
involuntary medications are the generally appropriate way to deal with criminal defendants
who are incompetent to stand trial. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and
Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 915 (2011) (“What is the point of
keeping an incompetent defendant in a hospital to restore competence if restoration is
made impossible by treatment refusal? The intrusion of forcible medication is not trivial,
to be sure, but neither is it so extensive that it should block the progress of the case.”);
Douglas Mossman, Is Prosecution “Medically Appropriate”?, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 15, 77 (2005) (“Defendants are entitled to psychiatric treatment that
may permit prosecution, and by providing defendants with such treatment, doctors assure
that civil society will fulfill its obligation to respect the rationality and humanity of all
persons.”); Lisa Kim Anh Nguyen, In Defense of Sell: Involuntary Medication and the
Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendant, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 597, 598 (2005)
(“[F]orcible medication administered to render a defendant competent to stand trial not
only protects the government’s interest in prosecution, but also the criminal defendant’s
interest not to be held indefinitely without trial.”). The Sell Court, though, arguably viewed
its decision as setting forth conditions that would fairly substantially limit involuntary
medications.
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would—as they now do—routinely find that involuntary medications
128
satisfy Sell.
C. Competency to Be Executed: Panetti v. Quarterman
The Supreme Court first considered what mental competencies a
person must possess in order for the state to carry out a death sentence
129
in the 1986 case Ford v. Wainright. In Ford, the Court ruled that
“the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a
130
sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” The decision in
131
Ford was only a plurality opinion, though,
accompanied by a
132
concurring opinion written by Justice Powell —that might, but
might not, be a narrower and thus controlling opinion133—as well as a
134
dissenting (in part) opinion by Justice O’Connor and a dissenting
opinion by Justice Rehnquist.135 Moreover, both the plurality opinion
and Justice Powell’s concurring opinion used a host of different
terms—perception, knowledge, awareness, comprehension—to
describe what mental state was required for someone to be competent
to be executed, without offering anything in the way of definition or
explanation of these terms.136

128 The fear that orders allowing the government to administer involuntary medications
under Sell were becoming routine in part motivated a recent Fourth Circuit opinion ruling
that a district court had erred in allowing such medication. See United States v. White, 620
F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Because we are persuaded that the district court’s order in
this case comes perilously close to a forcible medication regime best described not as
‘limited,’ but as ‘routine,’ we reverse.”); id. at 422 (“If we authorize the government to
forcibly medicate White, an all-too-common, non-violent, long-detained defendant, in a
case in which several factors strongly militate against forced medication, it would risk
making ‘routine’ the kind of drastic resort to forced medication for restoring competency
that the Supreme Court gave no hint of approving in Sell.”).
129 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
130 Id. at 409.
131 See id. at 401–18 (plurality opinion).
132 See id. at 418–31 (Powell, J., concurring).
133 Compare Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (stating that Powell’s
opinion is narrower and thus controlling), with id. at 969 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Powell’s opinion is not controlling).
134 Ford, 477 U.S. at 427–31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting in part).
135 Id. at 431–35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 409 (plurality opinion) (“comprehension of why he has been singled out and
stripped of his fundamental right to life”); id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring) (“know the
fact of [his] impending execution and the reason for it”; “perceives the connection between
his crime and his punishment”; and “aware that his death is approaching”).
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In 2007, the Court again considered the issue of competency to be
executed in Panetti v. Quarterman.137 Scott Panetti had been
sentenced to death for killing his wife’s parents, in front of his wife
and daughter, and then holding his wife and daughter hostage.138
Charged with first-degree murder, Panetti—who had a long and welldocumented history of serious mental illness pre-dating the offense—
139
140
insisted on representing himself. The trial was a “circus,” with
Panetti dressing as a cowboy and issuing subpoenas to such parties as
Jesus, the Pope, JFK, and a long list of less notable deceased
141
people.
Not surprisingly, the jury found Panetti guilty and
142
sentenced him to death.
At the time that the state set an execution date, Panetti was aware
that the state offered his criminal conviction for first-degree murder as
its reason for planning to execute him.143 But he believed that this
professed reason was not the state’s true reason for the death
sentence.144 Instead, Panetti believed that the state planned to execute
him “to stop him from preaching.”145 Panetti’s counsel claimed that
this delusion prevented Panetti from understanding why the state
planned to execute him, and thus, under Ford, Panetti was
incompetent to be executed.146 The state of Texas disagreed, claiming
that Panetti’s awareness of the state’s professed reason satisfied Ford
137 Panetti, 551 U.S. 930. Panetti also concerned several procedural issues. This article,
however, focuses on the issue of the substantive standard for competency to be executed.
138 Id. at 935–36.
139 Id. at 936. It could be hoped that after Indiana v. Edwards, Panetti would be found
incompetent to represent himself. 554 U.S. 164 (2008). But Edwards only allows—rather
than mandates—that states require a higher level of competency to represent oneself as
compared to competency to stand trial. Id. at 177–78. This Article does not examine
Edwards because that case turned almost entirely on the Supreme Court’s understanding
of the Constitutional guarantee of the right of self-representation. The Court’s
understanding of mental abnormality played little, if any, part in the decision.
140 Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a “Rational Understanding” of the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 287
(2007) (“And the defendant’s odd behavior ensured that the capital trial that ensued was a
circus: Panetti, who had long suffered from severe mental illness, stopped taking his antipsychotic medication and insisted on representing himself. During his trial, he engaged in
behavior that his appointed standby counsel later described as ‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and
‘trance-like.’”).
141 Brief for Petitioner at 11–14, Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 066407).
142 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 937.
143 Id. at 935–38, 940.
144 Id. at 954–55.
145 Id. at 955.
146 Id. at 938.
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and that his delusional beliefs did not diminish his competency to be
147
executed.
The Supreme Court held that awareness of the reason for execution
clouded by delusion might not satisfy Ford.148 The Court clarified
that a person is competent to be executed only if he possesses a
149
“rational understanding” of the reason for the execution.
The recognition that Panetti might simultaneously be able to
acknowledge the state’s professed reason for planning to execute him
yet not be able to appreciate that reason because of delusional beliefs
is important. Lay people are apt to discount the significance of
psychotic symptoms such as delusional beliefs because often people
who experience these symptoms demonstrate little or no impairment
in areas of their lives that the symptoms do not reach.150 There are, to
be sure, many problems with the Panetti decision, including the
Court’s failure to explain what “rational understanding” requires. But
the Court’s recognition that for someone who is experiencing
delusional beliefs, “awareness of the State’s rationale for an execution
is not the same as a rational understanding of it”151 demonstrates an
admirably deep understanding of the way that delusional beliefs can
operate.
III
PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF SEX OFFENDERS
All states and the federal government provide for the civil
commitment of someone who because of a mental illness is a danger
to himself or to others.152 Historically, civil commitment has been
considered as operating separately from the criminal law—civil
commitment has been viewed as a permissible kind of preventive
detention precisely because the detention was not a punishment,
147

Id. at 940–41, 950–52.
Id. at 959–60.
149 Id.
150 As Elyn Saks explains, “Psychosis is like an insidious infection that nevertheless
leaves some of your faculties intact; in a psychiatric hospital, for example, even the most
debilitated schizophrenic patients show up on time for meals, and they evacuate the ward
when the fire alarm goes off.” ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD 98–99 (2007).
151 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959.
152 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the CivilCriminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 70 (1996) (“All states have statutes permitting the indefinite
civil commitment of persons who are mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or
others.”).
148

KLEIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/30/2012 1:01 PM

The Mentally Disordered Criminal Defendant at the Supreme Court

235

punishment being the domain of the criminal law.153 During the
1990s, as public concerns grew about the dangers posed by the release
from prison of people who had been convicted of sex offenses,
legislatures began to enact154 special civil commitment statutes that
allowed the continued detention of a convicted sex offender if that
person was determined to be a danger to others because of a mental
155
disorder.
These statutes have been challenged as providing for criminal
punishment disguised as civil commitment. The Supreme Court has
considered the constitutionality of one state’s—Kansas’s—statute
twice, first in 1997 and then again in 2002, initially upholding the
statute without reservation and then suggesting that the statute might
not satisfy all constitutional requirements after all.156 The Court
considered the constitutionality of the state of Washington’s sexually
violent predator civil commitment scheme—which is virtually
identical to Kansas’s—in 2001.157
In the course of deciding these cases, the Court necessarily had to
think about the particular features of civil commitment that
distinguish it from criminal punishment. Two factors have emerged as
important in making this determination: the definition of mental
158
illness and the provision of treatment to those who are committed.
The definition of mental illness is important because people who are
dangerous because of a mental illness have long been considered
proper subjects for civil commitment, whereas people who are
153

Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 113, 121 (1996) (“The criminal sanction should apply only to those who are
blameworthy, and then strictly in proportion to the offender’s desert. Preventive detention
of nonresponsible, blameless agents should therefore be solely the province of the civil
justice system.”).
154 Or to re-enact. See ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL
PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 22–23 (2006) (describing the
Kansas statute at issue in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), as part of the
“second-wave” of legislation providing for the civil commitment of sex offenders).
155 E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. §
394.912(10) (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (West, Westlaw through 2010
Legis. Sess.); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (McKinney 2011); WIS. STAT. §
980.01(7) (West 2007). A charge of a sex offense might also qualify someone for
commitment under these statutes, if the person charged were found to be either not
competent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5929a03(a) (1999).
156 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,
413–14 (2002).
157 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 260–62 (2001).
158 See infra Part III.A.–B.
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dangerous for reasons other than a mental illness have not.159 The
provision of treatment is important because providing treatment is
evidence that the commitment is civil, while withholding treatment
might be evidence that the “civil commitment” really is criminal
160
punishment.
A. Mental Abnormality and Volitional Control: Kansas v. Hendricks
Kansas v. Hendricks was the first Supreme Court case to consider
whether Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act violated any
161
constitutional guarantees. Leroy Hendricks had been convicted of
numerous child molestation offenses over the course of thirty
years.162 As Hendricks was set to be released from prison for his
latest conviction, Kansas determined that Hendricks satisfied the
statute’s definition of a sexually violent predator; that is, he was a
“‘person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually
violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
predatory acts of sexual violence.’”163
Hendricks alleged that Kansas’s statute subjected to detention
people who were not proper subjects for civil commitment, and
therefore, his detention under this statute violated the Due Process
Clause as well as the double jeopardy and ex post facto provisions of
the Constitution.164 All of these claims hinged upon whether Kansas’s
statute really did provide for civil commitment rather than, as
Hendricks alleged, for criminal punishment.165
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with Hendricks, ruling that the
statute improperly allowed for the civil commitment of people who
166
were not mentally ill. On appeal, Kansas argued that the statute’s
definition of “mental abnormality” does identify people who are
proper subjects for civil commitment.167

159

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
161 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360–61.
162 Id. at 354.
163 Id. at 352, 355 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2011)).
164 Id. at 356.
165 Id. at 360–61.
166 Id. at 356.
167 Id. The statute defines “mental abnormality” as “a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and
160
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In considering whether those who are “mentally abnormal” as
defined by the Kansas statute may properly be civilly committed, the
United States Supreme Court observed that “[s]tates have in certain
narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of
people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose
168
a danger to the public health and safety.”
The Court thus
determined that the key feature of a proper civil commitment statute
is that “it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to
169
those who are unable to control their dangerousness.” The Court
rejected Hendricks’s argument that only people who are “mentally ill”
170
as defined by psychiatrists may properly be civilly committed.
The Court is certainly correct that the law should not invest any
particular scheme for defining mental disorder with “talismanic
significance.”171 Indeed, while the expertise of psychologists and
other mental health professionals should inform the work of the
criminal law, the goals of psychology are not necessarily the goals of
criminal law, and a diagnostic scheme that works for psychology
might not be entirely well-suited for the criminal law.172 The Court’s
opinion looks to psychological experts appropriately; for example,
using the inclusion of pedophilia in the current Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association173 as a
factor supporting but not compelling the conclusion that the Kansas

safety of others.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.).
168 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
169 Id. at 358.
170 Id. at 358–59.
171 Id. at 359.
172 See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxxiii (4th
ed., text rev. 2000) (“[T]he clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV mental disorder is not
sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a ‘mental disorder,’ ‘mental
disability,’ ‘mental disease,’ or ‘mental defect.’”); id. at xxxvii (“The clinical and
scientific considerations involved in categorization of these conditions as mental disorders
may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments. . . .”).
173 The APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual contains the criteria most commonly
used to diagnose mental disorders in this country. See Nancy S. Erickson, Use of the
MMPI-2 in Child Custody Evaluations Involving Battered Women: What Does
Psychological Research Tell Us?, 39 FAM. L.Q. 87, 90–91 (2005) (“The categories of
mental disorders currently commonly used by psychiatrists and psychologists are those
found in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV), published in 1994, to which text revisions were added in 2000 (DSM-IVTR).”).

KLEIN (DO NOT DELETE)

238

10/30/2012 1:01 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91, 207

statute identified people who were dangerous because of a mental
174
disorder.
The Hendricks Court erred with respect to the issue of diagnosis by
not explaining clearly why the Constitution requires that a civil
commitment statute “narrows the class of persons eligible for
confinement to those who are unable to control their
dangerousness.”175 The Court’s opinion reads as if the requirement is
simply narrowing for the sake of narrowing. But the historical, moral
purpose of narrowing is to exclude from eligibility for civil
commitment those people who can be held responsible for their
176
actions under the criminal law.
Typically, we count on criminal
law to prevent people from causing harm. People who are rational
actors are expected to be deterred from violating the law by the
prospect of punishment—and if they are not deterred, then they are
deserving of punishment when they do violate the law.177 But some
people, because of a mental illness, are not rational actors. They
cannot be expected to respond to the law’s deterrent effect and they
are not morally blameworthy if their behavior does not conform to the
requirements of the law. Because their impairments make them unfit
for criminal law, they can be preventively detained under civil
commitment statutes.178
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion comes closest to recognizing
that civil commitment statutes should apply only to people who are
not fit subjects for criminal punishment.179 Although he agrees that
the Kansas statute provides for civil commitment rather than criminal
punishment, he also cautions that “[i]f, however, civil confinement
174 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In this action, the mental
abnormality-pedophilia-is at least described in the DSM-IV.”) (citation omitted).
175 Id. at 358.
176 Steve C. Lee, Recent Developments, How Little Control?: Volition and the Civil
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002), 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 385, 385 (2003) (“Traditionally, civil confinement has been
employed for the treatment and incarceration of non-responsible, non-culpable actors such
as the severely mentally ill or the legally and criminally insane.”).
177 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty
Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 141–42 (2011)
(“With respect to responsible actors, the State can use the criminal law. It can punish the
deserving for the commission of a crime. For a responsible agent, the State should not
intervene in any substantial liberty-depriving way prior to his commission of an offense
for fear of denying his autonomy.”).
178 Id. at 141 (“If the State denies the agent is a responsible agent, it can detain him. It
can treat him as it treats other non-responsible agents, as a threat to be dealt with, without
fear of infringing his liberty or autonomy interests.”).
179 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or
if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category
to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified,
our precedents would not suffice to validate it.”180
The Court’s failure in Hendricks to make clear that the purpose of
the narrowing requirement is to ensure that responsible actors are left
to the criminal punishment system while only nonresponsible actors
are potentially subject to civil commitment invited the challenge
presented in Kansas v. Crane.181 In Hendricks, the petitioner had
admitted that he lacked control, and there was abundant evidence to
182
confirm this admission.
But what of petitioners who do not so
clearly lack control? Michael Crane claimed that the fact that
Hendricks was unable to control his behavior was critical to the
Court’s decision in Hendricks to uphold Kansas’s statute.183 And
because in Crane’s case there had been no finding that he was unable
to control his behavior, he argued that the state could not properly
subject him to civil commitment under the statute.184
The Supreme Court agreed with Crane, ruling that a finding of lack
of control is required; otherwise, civil commitment might simply be
deterrence in disguise.185 Only Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
186
Thomas, dissented. The point of the dissent was not that lack of
control is not a requirement of civil commitment; instead, the dissent
argued that Kansas’s “mental abnormality” requirement sufficiently
distinguishes those people whose behavior can be deterred from those
people whose behavior cannot be deterred.187 The dissent opposed the
Court’s conclusion that a separate finding of lack of control is
required but seemed to agree that only those who lack control may
properly be civilly committed.188
Even though all of the justices in Crane seemed to acknowledge
that lack of ability to control behavior is a required component of a
proper civil commitment scheme, neither the majority opinion nor the

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 373.
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.
Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.
Id. at 411–13.
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 415–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 422–23.
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dissent makes very clear the reason for this requirement.189 But
190
neither, however, do most civil commitment statutes. Despite the
strong force of the moral principle that civil commitment is only
justifiable for people whose behavior is so much the result of mental
illness that they cannot be held responsible for that behavior under
criminal law, it should be acknowledged that for the most part, civil
commitment does not work according to that principle in real life.
Most civil commitment statutes require only that someone be
191
dangerous to himself or others because of a mental illness.
Few
statutes even mention rationality, and it is highly unlikely that, even
in those jurisdictions where rationality is a consideration, civil
commitment is limited only to those who are so irrational that they
192
cannot be held responsible under the criminal law. It is surprising,
189 Both the majority opinion and the dissent explain that lack of ability to control
behavior is related to an inability to be deterred by the criminal law, but neither opinion
explains that the inability to be deterred by the criminal law makes someone unfit for
criminal punishment and therefore properly subject for civil commitment.
190 See sources cited infra note 192. See also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
576 (1975) (implicitly approving civil commitment when someone is mentally ill and
dangerous: “In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends.”); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
426 (1979) (“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for
themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community
from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”). In neither Donaldson nor
Addington did the Court discuss non-responsibility under the criminal law as a criterion for
civil commitment.
191 See John Parry, Summary, Analysis and Commentary, Life Services Planning for
Persons With AIDS-Related Mental Illnesses, 13 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 82, 84 (1989) (“First, almost all the statutes provide that the person to be committed
must have a recognizable mental disorder. . . . The second prong of most civil commitment
provisions requires that proposed patients be dangerous to themselves or others, gravely
disabled or in need of care and treatment.” (footnotes omitted)).
192 Alabama, for example, includes as a criterion in its commitment statute that “the
respondent is unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not
treatment for mental illness would be desirable.” ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.). An inability to make a rational decision regarding
treatment does not, however, render someone incapable of making any rational decision,
and it does not mean than someone would necessarily be found nonresponsible under the
criminal law. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001(6) (West, Westlaw through 2011
Legis. Sess.) (“unable to make responsible decisions with respect to the person’s
hospitalization”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.) (“lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment”). Other states’
statutes make no mention of rationality or responsibility. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §
334-60.2 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.) (“That the person is mentally ill or
suffering from substance abuse; (2) That the person is imminently dangerous to self or
others, is gravely disabled or is obviously ill; and (3) That the person is in need of care or
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then, that in the outpouring of scholarly criticism of sexually violent
193
predator statutes as not properly limiting civil commitment, there is
a general failure to acknowledge that whatever is wrong with sexually
violent predator statutes is in large measure wrong with civil
commitment as a whole.
B. The Role of Treatment Provision: Seling v. Young
The place of treatment provision in the civil commitment of
sexually violent predators is a complex issue. On one hand, the
provision of treatment is evidence of the state’s intent in enacting
civil commitment statutes. It is reasonable to think that civil
commitment schemes that are properly nonpunitive will provide
194
treatment to those who have been committed. On the other hand,
does a failure to provide treatment prove that the purpose of the
commitment is punitive? What about a legislature that admits to
mixed motives? What about a legislature that explains its failure to
provide treatment by asserting that no effective treatments exist?
The Supreme Court confronted these issues in Hendricks and then
195
again in the 2001 case Seling v. Young.
Together, these cases
present two distinct sets of questions about providing treatment to
people who have been civilly committed. The first set of questions
involves treatment provision as evidence of a legislature’s intent in
creating a particular civil commitment scheme. Hendricks, for
treatment, or both, and there is no suitable alternative available through existing facilities
and programs which would be less restrictive than hospitalization.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
66-329(11) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.) (“(a) Is mentally ill; and (b) Is,
because of such condition, likely to injure himself or others, or is gravely disabled due to
mental illness”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West, Westlaw through 2012
legislation) (allowing civil commitment of “a mentally ill person:(1) Who presents a
danger or threat of danger to self, family or others as a result of the mental illness; (2) Who
can reasonably benefit from treatment; and (3) For whom hospitalization is the least
restrictive alternative mode of treatment presently available.”).
193 See e.g., Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and
Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30
N.M. L. REV. 69, 84 (2000) (observing that “the Hendricks opinion has generated ample
commentary, most of it negative”).
194 Indeed, the Supreme Court arguably acknowledged at least some sort of a right to
treatment in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982): “respondent’s liberty
interests require the State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint.” See also Douglas G. Smith, The
Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement of Adequate Treatment, 49
B.C. L. REV. 1383, 1399–1401 (2008).
195 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250
(2001).
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example, argued that because commitment under Kansas’s sexually
violent predator statute does not ensure the provision of treatment, the
purpose of the commitment must be punishment, and thus, detention
under the statute must be criminal rather than civil.196 All of the
Justices seem to have agreed that as a practical matter Hendricks did
197
not receive treatment. But the Justices did not agree about the legal
conclusions that should be drawn from this fact. The majority opinion
evidences confusion about Kansas’s position on the treatment issue,
considering two possibilities: (1) the possibility that Kansas regarded
Hendricks as untreatable and therefore did not intend to provide any
treatment; and (2) the possibility that Kansas regarded Hendricks as
treatable but had other, more primary goals to focus on and might or
198
might not provide treatment. The majority did not find fault with
either position, seeming to accept that providing treatment was not the
primary purpose of Kansas’s statute, and, thus, failure to provide
treatment was not evidence of a punitive purpose.199 The dissent
viewed Kansas’s position that Hendricks was treatable combined with
Kansas’s failure to provide treatment as proof of the legislature’s
punitive intent.200 It is not clear what the dissent would say about a
legislature that was up-front about its lack of intent to provide
treatment.
The second set of questions involves treatment as a right of those
who have been committed under schemes that are properly civil. Even
if the purpose of the commitment is not punitive, does the state
nevertheless have a legal obligation to provide treatment? Andre
Young, who had been committed under Washington state’s sexually
violent predator statute, argued that the state’s failure to provide
treatment demonstrated that its commitment scheme is punitive.201
The Court rejected this argument because Washington’s scheme had
already been determined to properly provide for civil rather than
criminal commitment.202 The Court did not dismiss the state’s failure
to provide treatment as having no legal significance, however.203
196

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
See id. at 365–66.
198 Id. at 365–68.
199 Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the object or purpose of the Kansas law had
been to provide treatment but the treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere
pretext, there would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to punish.”).
200 Id. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 256, 259–60 (2001).
202 Id. at 260–61.
203 See id. at 265–67.
197
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Instead, the Court suggested Young could argue that the state’s failure
to provide treatment violated either the state’s own statutory mandates
204
or the federal Constitution’s guarantee of due process, or both. But
the Court was clear that even if Young succeeded in proving a
violation of these guarantees, a ruling that the commitment was
criminal rather than civil would not be among the possible
205
remedies.
One issue that the Court might have been expected to address in
these cases but did not is whether our current understanding of people
who commit sexually violent offenses allows for accurate predictions
of dangerousness. Inability to accurately predict dangerousness is a
long-standing criticism of civil commitment generally.206 Does this
criticism apply with more or less force to the kind of predictions
called for under sexually violent predator statutes? Many people seem
to believe that someone who has committed a sexually violent offense
in the past is especially likely to commit such an offense in the
future.207 Research, however, suggests that this is not necessarily
true.208
Another question not considered directly by either Hendricks or
Seling is whether any effective treatments actually exist for the
disorders that cause sexually violent predators to be unable to control
their behaviors. Whether any effective treatment exists for mental
disorders such as pedophilia (Hendricks’s disorder) is uncertain. It is
more certain—although not absolutely certain—that no effective
treatments exist for antisocial personality disorder (Young’s
204

See id.
Id. at 265.
206 See, e.g., Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 439, 452 (1974) (“Neither psychiatrists nor other behavioral scientists are
able to predict the occurrence of violent behavior with sufficient reliability to justify the
restriction of freedom of persons on the basis of the label of potential dangerousness.”).
207 See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83
CALIF. L. REV. 885, 897–98 (1995) (noting that “public continues to perceive, as it has for
decades, that the threat from sex offenders is greater than it actually is”); Michelle Olson,
Putting the Brakes on the Preventive State: Challenging Residency Restrictions on Child
Sex Offenders in Illinois Under the Ex Post Facto Clause, 5 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 403,
432 (2010) (noting “the common belief that sex offenders re-offend at an unusually high
rate”).
208 See Joëlle Anne Moreno, “Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to it that in the
Process He Does Not Become a Monster”: Hunting the Sexual Predator with Silver
Bullets—Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415—and a Stake through the Heart—Kansas v.
Hendricks, 49 FLA. L. REV. 505, 554–57 (1997) (“There is no reliable empirical evidence
that criminal recidivism rates are greater among sex offenders than among any other group
of offenders.”).
205
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disorder).209 The importance of this question is undermined, however,
by the Court’s statements in both Hendricks and Seling that the
existence of an effective treatment is not a requirement of civil
commitment: “We acknowledged that not all mental conditions were
treatable. For those individuals with untreatable conditions, however,
we explained that there was no federal constitutional bar to their civil
confinement, because the State had an interest in protecting the public
from dangerous individuals with treatable as well as untreatable
210
conditions.”
The Court’s position on the place of treatment provision in an
assessment of a statute that provides for the civil commitment of
sexually violent predators creates an odd set of contradictory
incentives for states. On one hand, providing treatment serves as
evidence that the state intended the commitment to be civil rather than
criminal. On the other hand, proclaiming intent to provide treatment
and then not actually providing it might be viewed as evidence that
the intent to provide treatment was not sincere. Disclaiming the intent
to provide treatment, on the grounds that treatment is ineffective,
likely will be regarded neutrally when a court is looking for evidence
of the state’s intent. These evidentiary conclusions seem to say to
states that it is somewhat risky to include treatment provisions as part
of a statute authorizing the civil commitment of sexually violent
predators. Creating disincentives for treatment provision would be an
unfortunate consequence of the Court’s decisions in Hendricks and
Crane.
CONCLUSION
The ties between clinical psychology and criminal law are many.
Mental states are important to criminal law, in a variety of ways. The
trial of a criminal defendant, the determination of criminal
responsibility, the imposition of a death penalty—all require the
assessment of mental states. And culpability is at least partly a
function of such mental states as awareness, understanding, and
intention; we consider those who deliberately cause harm to be more
209 See Donna L. Hall et al., The Increasingly Blurred Line Between “Mad” and
“Bad”: Treating Personality Disorders in the Prison Setting, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1277, 1292
(2011) (“Although today’s correctional treatment programs are significantly more
promising than in past decades, proven, effective treatment for severe antisocial
personality disorder remains largely illusive.”).
210 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 366 (1997)).
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blameworthy than those who unintentionally cause harm. Moreover,
we believe that in general, deterring people from committing crimes
is the job of criminal punishments and that only those whose mental
impairments make them undeterable may be preventively detained
under the civil law. Mental states thus define the dividing line
between civil commitment and criminal punishment and also define
degrees of culpability within criminal law generally.
In the last decade, the Supreme Court decided cases that involved
all of these issues. And the Court seems willing if not eager to decide
more cases that involve questions about the proper relationship of
clinical psychology to criminal law. The Court’s ability to consult
psychology appropriately when answering criminal law’s questions is
important for the actual as well as the perceived integrity of both law
and psychology.211

211

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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